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Military Justice as Justice:
Fitting Confrontation Clause
Jurisprudence into Military Commissions
Christina M. Frohock*

ABSTRACT
he Guantinamo prosecution of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged
mastermind behind the deadly USS Cole bombing, highlights an
the
unresolved issue in military commissions: whether
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution applies
to bar hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses. While al-Nashiri's
counsel recently moved for the military judge to take judicial notice that
the Confrontation Clause applies, it is worth considering that the question
may be framed differently. Rather than ask whether the Confrontation
Clause applies in a military commission, we may ask whether a
"testimonial statement" - the only kind of hearsay evidence that triggers
the Confrontation Clause-is a concept consistent with wartime tribunals.
This Article proposes that a testimonial statement is a uniquely civilian
concept, situating military commissions outside the scope of the
Confrontation Clause. The military commission trying al-Nashiri
nonetheless preserves the constitutional value of reliability while offering
different procedural protections than are offered in federal courts, such as
admitting hearsay statements from witnesses made unavailable by war.

* Professor of Legal Writing and Lecturer in Law, University of Miami School of Law; J.D.,
magna cum laude, New York University School of Law; M.A., University of Michigan; B.A.,
University of North Carolina. My thanks to Jeff Marcus for his criminal law insights and to
Allison Brede for her endless research assistance and enthusiasm.
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I.

Introduction

The prosecution of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged mastermind
behind the deadly USS Cole bombing, is underway in a secure, airconditioned courtroom at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.
Withstanding both the Antilles heat and the media glare, this capital trial is
testing a frequent criticism of Guantinamo military commissions. The
military commissions system has been criticized for abandoning
constitutional values, leaving detainees to languish for years and trial
defendants to fend for themselves in a parallel judicial system without
procedural protections afforded in federal courts.' Al-Nashiri recently
moved for the court to take judicial notice that the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution applies to his upcoming trial. The
question is significant, the answer is unclear, and the precedent is
compelling in military commissions going forward.
Defense counsel's pre-trial motion posed the question: Does the
Confrontation Clause apply in a military commission, specifically to future
issues involving hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses? 2 The military

See, e.g., Jane Sutton, Defendant Excluded from Secret Session in Guantdnamo Court, REUTERS
(June 14, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/us-usa-guantanamoidUSBRE95DOYZ20130614 (reporting that al-Nashiri's lead counsel, Rick Kammen, "wears
tiny kangaroo lapel pins to illustrate his belief that the Guant~namo tribunals are a kangaroo
court" and quoting Kammen that "[real justice occurs in the sunshine, not in secret");
Marjorie Cohn, Guantdnamo Prisoner Al-Nashiri's Case Demonstrates Unfairness of Military
Commissions, TRUTHOUT (June 18, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://truth-out.org/news/item/17058guantanamo-prisoner-al-nashiris-case-demonstrates-unfaimess-of-militarycommissions?tmpl=component&print-l (identifying "the basic unfairness of the military
commissions for adjudicating criminal cases" and noting that "[pleople can be put to death
after a trial that affords a reduced level of due process").
- The motion sought the following relief: "The defense requests that the Commission hold
that the Confrontation Clause... applies to this capital Military Commission ...[and] that all
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judge overseeing al-Nashiri's trial denied the motion as premature, leaving
the answer for another day. 3 For now, it is worth considering that the
question may be framed differently. This Article presents a different
formulation of the Confrontation Clause issue raised in the al-Nashiri case.
Rather than ask whether the Confrontation Clause applies in a military
commission, we may ask whether a "testimonial statement" -the only kind
of hearsay evidence that triggers the Confrontation Clause-is a concept
consistent with military commissions. If it is not, then a military
commission trial may be constitutional even under a different procedural
regime.
This Article rejects the false choice of applying or abandoning a
constitutional clause, proposing instead that a testimonial statement is a
uniquely civilian concept, and, thus, military commissions are outside the
scope of the Confrontation Clause. The military commission trying alNashiri preserves Sixth Amendment values even as it offers different
procedural protections than are offered in federal courts, such as admitting
hearsay statements from witnesses made unavailable by war.
The Article first describes procedural protections for defendants in the
United States' system of military commissions, focusing on al-Nashiri as a
case study and tracking hearsay rules through three iterations of the
military commissions system since September 11, 2001. Next, the Article
examines the Supreme Court's concepts of testimonial statements and
nontestimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v.
Washington and subsequent decisions. The Article then argues that
nontestimonial statements are the only kind of hearsay evidence at issue in
military commissions. Finally, returning to the al-Nashiri case, the Article
argues that the military commissions system preserves the constitutional
value of reliability in the distinctive setting of a wartime tribunal.
II. Procedural Protections in Military Commissions
A. Charges Against Al-Nashiri
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in 1965 to
Yemeni parents. 4 He holds both Saudi and Yemeni citizenship. 5 Al-Nashiri
future issues involving Sixth Amendment confrontation rights will be determined on the basis
that the Sixth Amendment . . .applies to this capital Military Commission." Defendant's
Motion to Take Judicial Notice at 1, United States v. Al-Nashiri, AE 109 (Military Comm'n
available at http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/
Sept. 12, 2012),
Judiciary
Trial
alnashiriz/A%2ONashiri%2011%20(AE109).pdf.
Order on Defense Motion to Take Judicial Notice at 2-3, United States v. Al-Nashiri, AE
109C (Military Comm'n Trial Judiciary Aug. 22, 2013) (denying motion both as an improper
request for an advisory opinion and on the basis of constitutional avoidance).
Patrick E. Tyler, Threats and Responses: Terror Trail; Qaeda Suspect Was Taking Flight
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first encountered Osama bin Laden in the mid-1990s, and their relationship
developed into personal meetings, instructions for attacks, and thousands
of dollars in money transfers. 6 In 1998, after learning of his cousin's suicide
bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, al-Nashiri joined
al Qaeda. 7 The United States considers al-Nashiri, now detained and facing
trial in Guant~namo, to be "one of al-Qaida's most skilled, capable, and
8
prolific operational coordinators" and "a ruthless operator."
According to his detainee file, al-Nashiri planned and carried out
several high-profile attacks on United States and other western targets. On
January 3, 2000, following directions from bin Laden, he plotted to
detonate explosives against the USS The Sullivans as it refueled in the
Yemeni Port of Aden, the entry to a major waterway for oil shipments from
the Middle East to Europe. 9 The attempted bombing failed. 10 A small boat
filled with explosives, which was intended to hit the ship, capsized and
sank soon after launching." Despite this failure, plans to strike a United
States naval ship continued.
Training Last Month, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at A17, availableat 2002 WLNR 4428704.
5 Memorandum from Dep't of Def. for Commander, United States S. Command, Subject:
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S), at 1 (Dec. 8,
2006) [hereinafter Status Review Tribunal Memorandum], available at http://projects.
nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/10015-abd-al-rahim-al-nashiri (last visited Mar. 10, 2014)
("Citizenship: Yemen"); The Guantdnamo Docket: Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, N.Y. TIMES,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/10015-abd-al-rahim-al-nashiri (last visited
Mar. 10, 2014) ("Citizen of Saudi Arabia").
" Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10015 at 19,
26, United States v. A1-Nashiri (March 14, 2007) [hereinafter Status Review Hearing
Transcript], availableat http://www.defense.gov/news/transcriptjisnlOO15.pdf.
Id. at 6. At the time of al-Nashiri's capture in 2002, the United States government viewed
his al Qaeda membership as pre-dating, and even influencing, the Kenyan attack. See Philip
Sheldon, Threats and Responses: Terror Network; A Major Suspect in Qaeda Attacks Is in U.S.
Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at Al, availableat 2002 WLNR 4051180 ("Another American
official said Mr. Nashiri was so dedicated to Al Qaeda's cause that he recruited a cousin to be
one of the suicide bombers in the attack on the American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, in
August 1998.").
Status Review Tribunal Memorandum, supra note 5 ("Detainee is one of the highestranking, most skilled, and dangerous al-Qaida operatives captured to date."); Sheldon, supra
note 7.
Status Review Tribunal Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3; Press Release, Dep't of Defense,
DOD Announces Charges Referred Against Detainee Al Nashiri (Sept. 28, 2011) [hereinafter
Press Release, Dep't of Def. 1], availableat http://www.defense.gov/release /release.aspx?re
leaseid=14821; see Margaret Coker, Warning Turns Focus to Yemen-Based al Qaeda Branch, WALL
STREET JOURNAL,

Aug. 3, 2013, at A8.

Status Review Tribunal Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3.

Id.
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The USS Cole became the next target, as bin Laden again supplied the
idea for an attack." Funding this operation himself, al-Nashiri bought a
vehicle and explosives in Yemen, concealing the explosives in fishing
coolers.1 3 He instructed his operatives "to carry out an attack on the next
US warship that entered the port" and then travelled to Afghanistan. 4 On
15
October 12, 2000, a small boat filled with bombs approached the USS Cole.
The boat appeared to be a garbage barge, with two men dressed in civilian
clothes at the helm. 6 The men gestured amiably to USS Cole
crewmembers. 7 They then detonated the bombs.' 8 The explosion killed
seventeen sailors, wounded approximately forty sailors, and ripped a
thirty-by-thirty-foot hole in the side of the ship.19
Almost exactly two years later, on October 6, 2002, al-Nashiri
orchestrated an attack on the French civilian oil tanker Merchant Vessel
(M/V) Limburg in the Gulf of Aden. 2° The explosion caused both loss of life
and environmental damage, killing one crewmember and spilling
21
approximately 90,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf.
In late October 2002, soon after the MIV Limburg bombing, al-Nashiri
was captured in the United Arab Emirates carrying several false passports
with different aliases and from different countries. 22 He was placed in

L2 Id.
Memorandum from Dep't of Def. to Personal Representative, Subject: Summary of
Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - Al Nashiri, Abd Al Rahim Hussein
Mohammed 2 (Feb. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Al Nashiri Evidence Summary], available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/ISN10015.pdf.
1 Status Review Tribunal Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3.
Status Review Hearing Transcript, supra note 6, at 6.
16 Press Release, Dep't of Def., Charges Sworn Against Detainee Al-Nashiri (June 30, 2008)
[hereinafter Press Release, Dep't of Defense 2], available at http://www.defense.gov/releases
/release.aspx?releaseid=12031.
IId.
s Id.
:i Status Review Hearing Transcript, supra note 6, at 6; Press Release, Dep't of Defense 2,
supra note 16; Press Release, Dep't of Defense 1, supra note 9; Press Release, Dep't of Def.,
DOD Announces Charges Sworn Against Detainee Nashiri (April 20, 2011) [hereinafter Press
Release, Dep't of Defense 3]; Sheldon, supra note 7. In September 2004, a Yemeni court
sentenced al-Nashiri to death in absentia for the USS Cole bombing. See Abd al-Rahim alNashiri, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 26, 2002), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/26/abd-alrahim-al-nashiri.
20 Al Nashiri Evidence Summary, supra note 13, at 2; Press Release, Dep't of Defense 1,
supra note 9; Press Release, Dep't of Defense 3, supra note 19.
71 New Charges Filed Against Suspect in U.S.S. Cole Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, at A8,
available at 2011 WLNR 7760698; Press Release, Dep't of Defense 1, supra note 9; Press Release,
Dep't of Defense 3, supranote 19.
22 Status Review Tribunal Memorandum, supra note 5, at 6; Al Nashiri Evidence Summary,
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United States custody and interrogated by the CIA until September 2006,
when he was transferred to Guantinamo. 23 The Department of Defense
24
then categorized al-Nashiri as an enemy combatant.
During a hearing in Guantinamo to review his enemy combatant
status, al-Nashiri proclaimed his innocence. 25 He is not a member of al
Qaeda, but simply a fisherman who, like many young men, happens to
travel and spend time in various countries including Yemen, the United
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Chechnya. 26 He did buy explosives, but only as a common practice for
digging wells in Yemen. 27 He knows the individuals involved in the
bombings of the USS Cole and the MIV Limburg, but solely as business
associates in the fishing industry. 28 After all, he was in Afghanistan when
those explosions occurred. 29 Osama bin Laden's money transfers paid for
"personal expenses" and a "fishing project," not bombs: "I left the people
and I have no idea what they did afterwards." 30 At one point he requested
31
forged passports, but never received them.
Most powerful among al-Nashiri's proclamations of innocence was his
explanation for prior confessions. Al-Nashiri stated that he had been
tortured by Americans "from the time I was arrested five years ago." 32 His

supranote 13, at 2.
' Status Review Tribunal Memorandum, supra note 5, at 6; Al Nashiri Evidence Summary,
supra note 13, at 2. The CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations. See Adam Liptak,
Detainee Says Torture Led to Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at A10, available at 2007
WLNR 6102193 (reporting that al-Nashiri was held by the CIA in undisclosed locations until
his transfer to Guant~namo); Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Says C.I.A. Destroyed 92 Tapes of
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, at A16, availableat 2009 WLNR 4058714 (identifying
Thailand as interrogation location).
2 For al-Nashiri's combatant status review, the Department of Defense defined an enemy
combatant as "an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida [sic]
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." Al Nashiri Evidence Summary, supra note
13, at 1.
23 Status Review Hearing Transcript, supra note 6, at 11-14.
26 Id. at 11-12, 25, 27-28.
2 Id.
at 19.
2 Id. at 13, 24.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 26, 31.
31 Status Review Hearing Transcript, supra note 6, at 14.
32 Id. at 15. A1-Nashiri's descriptions of the torture he endured are redacted on the hearing
'
'

transcript. Id. at 16. See also Associated Press, supra note 21 ("Mr. Nashiri was captured in
Dubai in November 2002 and flown to a C.I.A. prison in Afghanistan known as the Salt Pit
before being moved to a clandestine C.I.A. facility in Thailand, where he was waterboarded
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33
confessions after capture were a product of that torture rather than truth.
Less than a year after al-Nashiri's status review hearing, the CIA confirmed
the fact of his mistreatment. Director General Michael V. Hayden admitted
that three al Qaeda prisoners had been subjected to waterboarding, the
35
34
interrogation method that replicates drowning. One was al-Nashiri.
In addition to accusations of bombing both the USS Cole and the MIV
Limburg and attempting to bomb the USS The Sullivans, al-Nashiri allegedly
played a pivotal role in planning numerous other terrorist attacks against
United States interests on land and water. 36 For these alleged crimes, he
will be tried by military commission in Guantfnamo on charges of
treachery, murder, attempted murder, terrorism, conspiracy, intentionally
causing serious bodily injury, attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects,
and hijacking a vessel. 37 Prosecutors seek the death penalty.
In a sense, al-Nashiri is fortunate. He has endured detention for over a
decade, CIA interrogation, waterboarding, and two rounds of capital
charges. Military officers first swore charges against al-Nashiri in 2008
under the Bush Administration, which charges were subsequently
withdrawn. 38 Officers reswore charges in 2011 under the Obama

twice. In December 2002, he was moved again to a C.I.A. prison in Poland and subjected to a
series of interrogation techniques that included some not authorized by Justice Department
guidelines.").
33 Status Review Hearing Transcript, supra note 6, at 10, 15.
' Richard Esposito & Jason Ryan, CIA Chief. We Waterboarded, ABC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/TheLaw/story?id4244423&page=1.
:-, Id.
'3f, Charge Sheet at 3-5, U.S. v. Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad Al Nashiri (Sept. 15,
2011) [hereinafter Nashiri Charge Sheet 2011], available at http://media.miamiherald.com/
smedia/2011/9/23/9/43/I6phN.So.56.pdf; Status Review Tribunal Memorandum, supra note
6, at 7 (stating that attacks included "a plot to sink a US warship or tanker in the Strait of
Hormuz (SoH) intended to block the Strait; a plot using an explosives-filled airplane against
western warship at Port Rashid, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE); a plot to blow up the US
Embassy in Sanaa, YM; maritime attacks in the Red Sea and off the coasts of al-Hudaydah and
Aden, YM; and a disrupted maritime operation targeting US, United Kingdom (UK), and
other NATO ships and submarines in the Strait of Gibraltar (SoG)").

Nashiri Charge Sheet 2011, supra note 36, at 3-4; see A1-Nashiri v. MacDonald, No. 115907 RJB, 2012 WL 1642306, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2012) (describing three events in
Yemen as basis for charges).
31 See Press Release, Dep't of Defense 2, supra note 16; see William Glaberson, Guantdnamo
Detainee Faces War Crimes Charges in Attack on Destroyer, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at A15,
availableat 2008 WLNR 12317603; Charlie Savage, U.S. Prepares to Lift Ban on GuantdnamoCases,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at Al, available at 2011 WLNR 1184100 [hereinafter Savage Guantanamo Cases]. Upon taking office, President Obama halted all Guant~namo military
commissions pending a detainee review. Compare Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897
(Jan. 22, 2009), availableat 2009 WL 166956, with infra text accompanying notes 60-65.
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Administration, and al-Nashiri's case is presently in pre-trial litigation. 39
The many years since al-Nashiri's capture have brought difficulty, to be
sure, but also have conferred a benefit: military procedures to try him are
enhanced and refined in meaningful ways. In fact, al-Nashiri is being tried
under the third iteration of the military commissions system in
Guantinamo, each iteration offering greater protections for the accused.
B.

Three Iterationsof MilitaryCommissions System

Soon after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States adopted
military commissions as tribunals to try individuals involved in the
"extraordinary emergency" of international terrorism. 0 Congress quickly
authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force"
against those responsible for the attacks in order to prevent future terrorist
acts. 41 On this congressional authorization, then-President Bush instituted a
system of detention, treatment, and trial in the age of terrorism. 42 On
November 13, 2001, President Bush signed an executive order prescribing
military justice for non-citizens: military commissions as courts to try al
Qaeda members and other international terrorists threatening the United
States. 43 The order does not mention Guant inamo nor specify a location for
military commission trials.44
President Bush based his order on the immediate danger of
international terrorism. 45 The September 11th attacks had demonstrated to
everyone "that a threat once thought hypothetical is all too real: there are
groups of persons with the organization, resources, and will to cause mass
death and destruction in the United States and elsewhere." 46 Accordingly,

3 See Press Release, Dep't of Defense 3, supra note 19.
See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 § 1(g) (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
41 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note).
"' See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("Consistent with
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, President Bush directed the use of force to
kill or capture and detain al Qaeda operatives, and where appropriate to try unlawful al
Qaeda combatants who had committed war crimes.").
Military Order, supra note 40, §§ 1, 2.
See id. §§ 3(a), 4(c)(1) (providing for detention "at an appropriate location designated by
the Secretary of Defense outside or within the United States" and for "military commissions to
sit at any time and any place, consistent with such guidance regarding time and place as the
Secretary of Defense may provide").
45 See Proclamation No. 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain
Terrorist Attacks, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 18, 2001) [hereinafter Proclamation]
(acknowledging the "continuing and immediate threat of further attacks").
46 AM. BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, REPORT AND
'
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the President declared it "not practicable to apply in military
commissions... the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district
courts." 47 Military commissions need only provide a "full and fair trial,"
admitting any evidence that would have "probative value to a reasonable
person." 48 Practical advantages of a military commission included
heightened security and protection of sensitive intelligence, 49 and the
50
Secretary of Defense could specify appropriately full and fair procedures.
51
While military commissions have a long history in the United States,
this first post-9/11 system offered minimal protections for defendants. The
Department of Defense established "procedures accorded the accused" for
The
military commission trials under President Bush's order. 52
prescribed
procedures
as
"the
but
exclusive,
Department's list was concise

ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS 1 (2002), available at http://www.
see also
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/military.authcheckdam.pdf;
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1541 note) ("Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were
committed against the United States and its citizens..
RECOMMENDATIONS

Military Order, supra note 40, § 1(f).
'4"
46, Id.

§ 4(2)-(3).

AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 46, at 16; Military Order, supra note 40, § 4(c)(4) (providing
for protection of classified information and closure of proceedings).
Military Order, supra note 40, § 4(b)-(c).
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006) ("Though foreshadowed in some
respects by earlier tribunals like the Board of General Officers that General Washington
convened to try British Major John Andre for spying during the Revolutionary War, the
commission 'as such' was inaugurated in 1847."); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346 (1952)
(dating military commissions back to "our nation's earliest days"); Barack Obama, President
of the United States, Remarks by the President on Nat'l Sec. at the Nat'l Archives (May 21,
2009) ("[Mjilitary commissions have a history in the United States dating back to George
Washington and the Revolutionary War. They are an appropriate venue for trying detainees
for violations of the laws of war."), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09.
5 DEP'T OF DEF., MILITARY COMM'N ORDER No. 1: PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY
COMMISSIONS OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM § 5
(2002) [hereinafter MILITARY COMM'N ORDER No. 11, available at http://www.defense.gov
/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf. The Department of Defense later issued a revision of this
Order. See DEP'T OF DEF., MILITARY COMM'N ORDER NO. 1: PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY
'19 See

MILITARY COMMISSIONS OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST

(2005) [hereinafter REVISED MILITARY COMM'N ORDER NO. 1], available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf. The Department also issued a list
of ten instructions for military commissions. See Military Comm'n Instructions Nos. 1-10,
DEP'T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2004/commissions _instructions.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2014) (a hyperlink appears on the page for a PDF version of each instruction).
The provisions discussed herein are consistent in both the 2002 Order and 2005 revision.
TERRORISM
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herein and no others shall govern such trials."53 These procedures allowed
exclusion of a defendant from his own trial,M prohibition on defense
counsel's revealing to his client any information presented during a closed
session,55 admission of all probative evidence without consideration of
prejudicial effect, 56 and witness testimony "by telephone, audiovisual
means, or other means," even if given without an oath.5 7 To the extent
procedures did benefit the defendant, including a presumption of
innocence and a requirement that the prosecution furnish a copy of all
charges in the defendant's native language, they did not create any
enforceable rights.5 8 Nor was the list secure, as it could be amended "from
59
time to time" by the Secretary of Defense.
The Department of Defense failed to mention hearsay in its list of
procedures. Hearsay is a prior out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. 60 Silence in the Department's list suggests an
indifference to hearsay admission; there were certainly no exclusions or
limits on the use of hearsay evidence in military commission trials. 61 Such
evidence would be admissible under the same standard as any other
evidence: so long as the presiding officer determines that it would have
"probative value to a reasonable person." 62
Not surprisingly, a prominent criticism of this post-9/11 military
commissions system focused on its procedural thinness and unilateral
creation. As quickly mandated by executive decree, military commissions
supranote 52, § 1.
5(K), 6(B)(3) ("A decision to close a proceeding or portion thereof may include a

" MILITARY COMM'N ORDER No. 1,

ld.
I4

§§

decision to exclude the Accused .
.
Id. § 6(B)(3) ("Defense Counsel may not disclose any information presented during a
closed session to individuals excluded from such proceeding or part thereof.").
5" Id. § 6(D)(1) ("Evidence shall be admitted if, in the opinion of the Presiding Officer...
the evidence would have probative value to a reasonable person.").

Id. § 6(D)(2)(a); see id. § 6(D)(2)(b) ("The Commission may still hear a witness who
refuses to swear an oath or make a solemn undertaking; however, the Commission shall
consider the refusal to swear an oath or give an affirmation in evaluating the weight to be
given to the testimony of the witness.").
'g' Id. § 10; see also DEPT. OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 1 § 6 (2003),
available at http://www.defense.gov/newsMay2003/d20030430milcominstnol.pdf
("Neither
this Instruction nor any Military Commission Instruction issued hereafter, is intended to and
does not create any right....").
';
MILITARY COMM'N ORDER No. 1, supranote 52, § 11.
See MIL. COMM'N R. EVID. 801(c); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 413 (1985).
6 Hearsay is also absent from the revised Order and Military Commission Instructions. See
REVISED MILITARY COMM'N ORDER No. 1, supra note 52, at 11-12.
62 MILITARY COMM'N ORDER NO. 1, supra note 52, § 6(D)(1); see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 614 (2006) (describing this standard for evidence admission as a "striking feature" of
military commissions).
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had abandoned constitutional safeguards, jettisoning fundamental
protections for criminal defendants in the name of expediency and
practicability. Scholars were appalled, with hundreds of law professors
signing a letter to Congress decrying military commissions as "legally
deficient, unnecessary, and unwise." 63 President Bush's order did not
comply with basic due process, permitting "indefinite detention, secret
trials, and no appeals." 6 Further, the broken system seemed unfixable: the
more military commissions improved to respect constitutional principles
and resemble civilian courts, the less these alternative tribunals offered a
6
practical advantage over civilian courts to try international terrorists. 5
Over all objections, military commissions began in November 2004 at
the Guant~inamo naval station. 66 The location had advantages. On the
Southeast coast of Cuba, Guant~namo is close to the United States for easy
access and has been under the United States' complete jurisdiction and
control for more than a century. 67 But it lies outside United States territory
for purposes of denying rights to non-citizens.M Military detentions at the
naval station proceeded apace, eventually reaching a detainee population
of approximately 800.69 Soon, however, other branches of government

61 Letter from Law Professors and Lawyers to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Sen.
Judiciary Comm., at 1 (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/ documents/pdf/
Leahy.pdf (list of original signers of letter available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/OrigSig.pdf); see Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002) ("[T]he President's Order
establishing military tribunals for the trial of terrorists is flatly unconstitutional.").
" Letter from Law Professors and Lawyers to Hon. Patrick J.Leahy, Chairman, Sen.
Judiciary Comm., supra note 63.
; Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 342
(2002).
v' JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006:
ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL RULES AND COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS DOD RULES AND THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, at Summary (2007) [hereinafter ELSEA 2007], available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33688.pdf.
', See Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling
and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418 ("[Dluring the period of the
occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of this agreement the United
States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control."); see also Lease of Certain Areas for
Naval or Coaling Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. I, July 2, 1903, T.S. No. 426; Treaty Defining
Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1683.
' See, e.g., Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1430 (11th Cir. 1995)
(concluding Cuban migrants in Guantinamo "are without legal rights that are cognizable in
the courts of the United States"); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513 (11th
Cir. 1992) (explaining Haitian migrants interdicted at sea and brought to Guantinamo "have
no recognized substantive rights under the laws or Constitution of the United States").
" See Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 § 2 (Jan. 22, 2009).
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intervened to rein in the executive.
In 2006, ruling on a Guantdnamo detainee's petition for habeas corpus,
the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld rejected President Bush's
military commissions system as unconstitutional. 70 The Court respected
the practical advantages of military commissions,71 but found the
procedures to be wanting, lacking support from Congress, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, or the Geneva Conventions. 72 While military
commissions need not duplicate federal court procedures, they must
guarantee a minimal sense of justice and basic trial protections, including
the "right to be tried in [one's] presence"7 3 and the right to have
"information used to convict a person.., disclosed to him." 74 The first
iteration of the United States' post-9/11 military commissions system could
not stand.
Only a few months after the Supreme Court decided Hamdan, Congress
responded by enacting the Military Commissions Act ("MCA") of 200675ushering in the second iteration of the post-9/11 military commissions
system. The MCA of 2006 supplied congressional authority for the
President to establish military commissions that the Supreme Court had
found lacking. Further, the MCA legislated away any need for support
from either the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the Geneva
Conventions. 76 Congress maintained military commissions as alternative

70 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).

See id. at 620 ("The uniformity principle is not an inflexible one; it does not preclude all
departures from the procedures dictated for use by courts-martial. But any departure must be
tailored to the exigency that necessitates it."); id. at 634 ("[T]he procedures adopted to try
Hamdan deviate from those governing courts-martial in ways not justified by any 'evident
practical need,' . . . and for that reason, at least, fail to afford the requisite guarantees.").
See id. at 624 ("Exigency lent the commission its legitimacy, but did not further justify
the wholesale jettisoning of procedural protections."); see also id. at 567, 594-95, 624-25, 63435.
7," Id. at 633 (quoting Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3).
Id. at 635 (rejecting provisions of Military Commission Order No. 1, supra note 52, while
accepting that "the Government has a compelling interest in denying Hamdan access to
certain sensitive information").
-' Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 948a note) [hereinafter MCA of 2006]. Because Congress enacted separate Military
Commissions Acts in 2006 and 2009, references herein to the MCA include the year.
References to military commission rules reflect the MCA year discussed in the text.
76 The MCA removed military commissions from under the jurisdiction of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. See id. § 948b(c) ("The judicial construction and application of that
chapter are not binding on military commissions established under this chapter."). While a
military commission would afford "all the necessary 'judicial guarantees which are
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tribunals to federal courts, but attempted to remedy the deficiencies
identified by the Supreme Court, guaranteeing greater protections for
defendants than had either President Bush or the Department of Defense.
Under the MCA of 2006, a defendant continued to enjoy the
presumption of innocence 77 and receive charges in his native language. 78 In
addition, a defendant now had the right to be present for his own trial and,
so, to hear all information presented during proceedings.9 Oaths were
required of witnesses, 80 and the military judge could exclude any evidence
for which unfair prejudice substantially outweighed probative value. 81
Moreover, the MCA was controlling; the Secretary of Defense retained
authority to prescribe "[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures," but
82
could not contravene Congress' provisions.
While President Bush's order and accompanying Department of
Defense procedures had been silent on hearsay, the MCA of 2006
introduced rules on the topic. Hearsay evidence admissible in a trial by
general courts-martial would be similarly admissible in a trial by military
commission. 83 But military commissions cast a wider net, also admitting
hearsay evidence that would be excluded in a court-martial trial. Congress
invited the Secretary of Defense to prescribe provisions consistent with the
MCA, and new hearsay rules came into effect. 84
Under the Military Commission Rules of Evidence, hearsay was
admissible "on the same terms as any other form of evidence except as

recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples' for purposes of common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions," the Act made clear that the Geneva Conventions would not be a source
of rights for anyone subject to trial by military commission. Id. § 948b(f)-(g).
7 Id. § 9491(c).
:" Id. § 948s.

v Id. § 949a(b)(B). A defendant could be excluded during deliberation or voting of the
military commission members, or if he persisted in dangerous or disruptive conduct. MCA of
2006, §§ 949d(a)(2), d(b), d(d); see ELSEA 2007, supra note 66, at 20 ("The MCA does not provide
for the exclusion of the accused from portions of his trial, and does not allow classified
information to be presented to panel members that is not disclosed to the accused.").
0 MCA of 2006 § 949g(b).
'
Id. § 949a(b)(2)(F); MIL. COMM'N R. EVID. 403, published in MANUAL FOR MILITARY
COMMISSIONS (2007) [hereinafter MiL.COMM'N R. EVID.], available at http://www.defense.gov
/pubs/pdfs/the%20manual%20for%2Omilitary%20commissions.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
Evidence has probative value if it makes the existence of a consequential fact more or less
probable. Id. at 401.
'2 MCA of 2006 § 949a(a).
MIL. COMM'N R. EvID. 803(a); see also MCA of 2006 § 949a(a) (explaining military
commission trials generally follow rules for court-martial trials).
' See MCA of 2006 § 949a(b); see generally MIL. COMM'N R. EvID. 801-07.
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provided by these rules or by any Act of Congress." 5 As with any other
form of evidence, a proponent must show that a reasonable person would
regard the hearsay as having probative value, and that value must not be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion,
waste of time, or redundancy.86 The "except as provided" language
amounted to little. Congress had already spoken in the MCA, and the
Rules of Evidence simply fleshed out those legislative provisions.
Accordingly, a military commission trial could admit hearsay evidence,
otherwise excluded in a court-martial trial, if the proponent alerted the
adverse party of his intention to offer the evidence and the particulars of
the evidence, all "sufficiently in advance to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to meet the evidence." 87 Notice should contain "any
materials regarding the time, place, and conditions under which the
statement was produced" and be given thirty days in advance.8
In the MCA, Congress provided for the exclusion of hearsay evidence
if the adverse party "demonstrates that the evidence is unreliable or
lacking in probative value." 89 Following this lead, the Rules of Evidence
excluded otherwise admissible hearsay only if the adverse party
"demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence is
unreliable under the totality of the circumstances."90 Thus, the sole burden
concerning reliability fell squarely on the shoulders of the party opposing
admission, and that burden was to disprove reliability. 91
The upshot is clear: military commission rules favored hearsay
admission. Indeed, the discussion notes in the Rules of Evidence concede
as much. The rationale for admitting hearsay evidence on the same terms
as any other evidence is grounded in the grim realities of war: witnesses
"are likely to be foreign nationals who are not amenable to process, and
other witnesses may be unavailable because of military necessity,
incarceration, injury, or death." 92 For any testifying witness, a defendant
certainly had the right to confrontation and cross-examination. 93 But

'

MIL. COMM'N R,EvID. 802.
IId. 401, 403.

MCA of 2006 § 949a(b).
s' MiL. COMM'N R. EVID. 803(b). Even if the proponent failed to meet these guidelines, the
evidence could still be admitted, as the judge would determine whether the adverse party had
received "a fair opportunity under the totality of the circumstances." Id.
MCA of 2006 § 949a(b).
0 MIL. COMM'N R. EviD. 803(c).
See id. 803, discussion note.
Id. 802, discussion note.
9- See MCA of 2006 § 949c; see also R. MIL.COMM'N 910(c) (2007) (requiring judge to advise
a defendant pleading guilty that he has the trial right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
who testify against him).
"2
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hearsay from unavailable witnesses was welcome. Because a military
commission trial is a creation of war, so too are its governing rules.
Military commissions under the Bush Administration resulted in three
convictions. 94 The election of Barack Obama in 2008 introduced the third
iteration of the post-9/11 military commissions system. Following up on a
campaign promise to close the Guantinamo detention center, two days
after inauguration President Obama took a first step and halted military
commissions pending a review of all Guantinamo detainees. 95 On May 15,
2009, President Obama announced the resumption of military
commissions, ensuring that this time "they are properly structured and
administered." 96 Detainee reviews continued. 97 Meanwhile, reforms would
, 4 David Hicks pleaded guilty in 2007 to providing material support for terrorism; Salim
Hamdan was tried and convicted in 2008 of providing material support for terrorism; and Ali
Hamza Ahmad Suliman al-Bahlul was tried and convicted in 2008 of conspiracy, solicitation
to commit murder, and providing material support for terrorism. See The Guantdnamo Trials,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/features/Guantnamo (last visited Mar. 11,
2014); JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2009 (MCA
2009): OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 2 (2013) [hereinafter ELSEA 2013]. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit vacated the convictions of both Hamdan and al-Bahlul. Hamdan v. United
States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324, 2013 WL
297726, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), vacating as moot No. 11-1324, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 8120
(D.C. Cir. April 23, 2013). The D.C. Circuit Court then granted rehearing en banc in Al Bahlul
and ordered al-Bahlul's counsel to "obtain a letter from the petitioner stating whether he
wishes to continue to pursue his case in this court." Order Granting Respondent's Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, at 1-2, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 2013); Order Demanding Letter
From Petitioner, at 1, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 2013).
'5 See Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 § 7 (Jan. 22, 2009) ("The Secretary of
Defense shall immediately take steps sufficient to ensure that ... all proceedings of such
military commissions to which charges have been referred but in which no judgment has been
rendered, and all proceedings pending in the United States Court of Military Commission
Review, are halted."). Some observers denounced President Obama's failure to close the
GuantAnamo detention center. See, e.g., Jackie Northam, Obama's Promise to Close Guantanamo
Prison Falls Short, NPR (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/1/23/169922171/obamaspromise-to-close-guantanamo-prison-falls-short.
') Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of President Barack
Obama on Military Commissions (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/statement-president-barack-obama-military-commissions. Observers continued to
denounce President Obama's decisions regarding Guantinamo detentions and military
commissions. See William Glaberson, Obama to Keep Tribunals; Stance Angers Some Backers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/16/us/
politics/16gitmo.htn1?_r=0 (quoting ACLU executive director Anthony D. Romero that he
would call "an inferior legal system to try detainees 'the Bush-Obama doctrine'"). For his part,
President Obama continues to press Congress to allow detainee transfers from Guantnamo
to the United States. See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the
President at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-
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enhance the legitimacy of military commissions "while bringing them in
line with the rule of law," including limiting the admissibility of hearsay
evidence "so that the burden will no longer be on the party who objects to
hearsay to disprove its reliability."9 8
With his eye on the rule of law, President Obama was no doubt
mindful of the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush,99 issued just
five months before his election. The Court in Boumediene held that the
Suspension Clause of Article I of the Constitution applies to Guantinamo
Bay, entitling non-citizen detainees to file writs of habeas corpus in federal
court "to challenge the legality of their detention." 100 While Cuba holds de
jure sovereignty over Guantdnamo, "the United States, by virtue of its
complete jurisdiction and control over the base, maintains de
facto sovereignty over this territory." 10' Considering the detainees' foreign
citizenship and insufficient status review, their apprehension on distant
battlefields and detention at the Guantinamo naval base, and the minimal
practical obstacles in allowing detainees to file habeas writs, the Court
found the United States' de facto sovereignty sufficient for application of the
Suspension Clause. 02 Although limited on its facts to constitutional habeas
relief, the Boumediene opinion introduced a new way of thinking about
Guantinamo: not as an overseas outpost devoid of non-citizen rights, but
as quasi-American territory within reach of the Constitution.
In the wake of these pronouncements from both the Supreme Court
and the new President, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of
2009 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

university) ("I have asked the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States
where we can hold military commissions.").
')See GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2010) ("An essential component

of the President's order calling for the closure of the detention facilities at the Guantnamo
Bay Naval Base was the initiation of a new and rigorous interagency review of all individuals
detained there .... This review is now complete."); see also id. at 9-15 (reporting results of
review, including detainee transfer approvals and security risks).
'38 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 96. Other
enhancements included exclusion of statements obtained through "cruel, inhuman and
degrading interrogation methods," greater latitude for a defendant to select his counsel,
protections for those who refuse to testify, and permission for military commission judges to
"establish the jurisdiction of their own courts." Id.
553 U.S. 723 (2008).

Id. at 771 ("We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at
Guantanamo Bay.").
"I Id. at 755; see also Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of
Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418.
1'2Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766-71.
"'o
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2010.103 Military commissions resumed in Guantdnamo and led to four
additional convictions. 104 Under the MCA of 2009, as under the MCA of
2006, a defendant has the right to attend his own trial and may be removed
from court only if he persists in dangerous or disruptive conduct. 105 He
may cross-examine witnesses who testify against him. 106 Again the
Secretary of Defense was tasked with setting procedures for military
commissions, consistent with Congress' provisions. 107
As announced by President Obama, the hearsay rules in military
commissions became more robust, no longer setting hearsay on a par with
other forms of evidence. 08 Like the MCA of 2006, the MCA of 2009
provides that hearsay evidence admissible in a trial by general court-

';

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat.

2574 (2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948a note (2012)) [hereinafter MCA of 2009].
' ' ELSEA 2013, supra note 94. Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi pleaded guilty in 2010 to
conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism; Omar Khadr pleaded guilty in 2010
to conspiracy to commit terrorism, providing material support for terrorism, murder,
attempted murder, and spying; Noor Uthman Mohamed pleaded guilty in 2011 to conspiracy
and providing material support for terrorism; and Majid Shoukat Khan pleaded guilty in 2012
to conspiracy, providing material support for terrorism, murder in violation of the laws of
war, and spying. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 94 (for information on each
individual detainee, follow the hyperlink under the detainee's name).
MCA of 2009 § 949d(d)(2); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)(1)(C) (stating that defendant waives
the right to be present when he persists in disruptive behavior). The military judge may
protect classified information from disclosure, but any information admitted into evidence
must be provided to the defendant. See MIL. COMM'N R. EVID. 505(a)(2), published in MANUAL
FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2010); MCA of 2009 § 949p-4 (specifying procedure for defendant
to discover classified information); see also Mark Martins, Chief Prosecutor, Remarks at
Guantinamo Bay 5 (June 14, 2013), (transcript available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/Statement-for-15-September-2013.pdf) (describing narrow exceptions
to defendant's right to be present, consistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43).
MCA of 2009 § 949a(b)(2)(A); see generally id. §§ 949a-n (setting rules for trial
",
procedure); id. §§ 950f-g (establishing right of appeal, first to U.S. Court of Military
Commission, then to U.S. Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit, and finally to U.S.
Supreme Court).
1X Id. § 949a(a); see David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a CounterterrorismTool, 5 J. NAT'L SEC.
L. & POL'Y 1, 34-36 (2011) (listing similarities between prosecutions in Article III court and in
military commission).
•' Under the MCA of 2006, Military Commission Rule of Evidence 802 provided for the
admission of hearsay "on the same terms as any other form of evidence." ML. COMM'N R.
EVID. 802. By contrast, under the MCA of 2009, there is no such rule of evidence. Compare
MCA of 2006 § 949a(b)(2) (admitting all evidence that would have probative value to a
reasonable person, and including broader admission for hearsay), with MCA of 2009
§§ 949a(b)(2)-(3) (giving the accused the right to suppress evidence that is not reliable or
probative, and shifting hearsay to a separate rule).
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martial is similarly admissible in a trial by military commission. 1' 9 Hearsay
excluded from a court-martial trial may be admitted in a military
commission trial only if the proponent gives sufficient notice and details of
the evidence, including the circumstances under which it was obtained.11 0
Unlike its predecessor, the MCA of 2009 places no burden on the
adverse party to disprove reliability."' Although the new Act does not
specify any burdens regarding reliability, the hearsay proponent would do
well to demonstrate to the military judge the bona fides of its proffered
evidence.11 2 For admission, the judge must determine that a hearsay
"statement is offered as evidence of a material fact," the statement is
probative on that fact, direct testimony from the witness is not a practical
option, and admission would best serve "the general purposes of the rules
of evidence and the interests of justice."11 3 In making this determination,
the judge may consider the totality of circumstances, including
corroboration of the statement, "indicia of reliability within the statement
itself," and whether the declarant's will was overborne, that is, overcome
14
by physical force or emotional pressure.
By its terms, this new hearsay rule is forged in the context of armed
conflict. The practical considerations behind witness availability in a
military commission trial are specific to a wartime tribunal. The military
judge must take into account not only a witness' location, but also "the
unique circumstances of military and intelligence operations during
hostilities, and the adverse impacts on military or intelligence operations
that would likely result from the production of the witnesses."' 15 The judge
is left to decide admissibility of hearsay evidence on a statement-bystatement basis, reflecting on grand considerations of justice not typically
16
at play in a hearsay analysis in civilian court.

"'

See MIL.COMM'N R. EvID. 803; MCA of 2009 § 949a(a) (applying procedures in court-

martial trials to military commission trials, except as provided in MCA).
Il@ MCA of 2009 § 949a(b)(3).
1
11

Compare id., with MCA of 2006 § 949a(b)(2).
See ELSEA 2013, supra note 94, at 28 ("The current rules do not expressly allocate the

burden of proof as to reliability of hearsay evidence. Presumably it falls on the proponent of
the evidence.").
"3- MCA of 2009 § 949a(b)(3); see MIL. COMM'N R. EvlD. 803 (restating elements of judge's
determination).
1- MCA of 2009 § 949a(b)(3); see MiL. COMM'N R. EvID. 803.
1l MCA of 2009 § 949a(b)(3); see MIL. COMM'N R. EviD. 803; cf. MCA of 2009 § 949a(b)(1)
(allowing Secretary of Defense to create exceptions to court-martial rules for use in military
commissions "as may be required by the unique circumstances of the conduct of military and
intelligence operations during hostilities").
IJ"See Robert M. Gates, Foreword to MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2010) (applying
procedures and rules of evidence from court-martial trials except as provided in the MCA "or
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So it goes in the prosecution of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Al-Nashiri is
being tried by military commission under the MCA of 2009, benefiting
from procedures and rules unavailable in prior military commissions
systems. Yet, despite these enhanced protections, al-Nashiri is not in
federal court, not before an Article IIjudge, and not facing a verdict from
civilian jurors. Even as reformed, military commissions remain an
alternative tribunal with distinct protections for the accused-and remain
exposed to criticisms of elevating "political expediency over considerations
of justice," 1 7 offering "less transparency and muddled rules,"" 8 and
granting "greater leniency for hearsay."11 9 Al-Nashiri's trial is a test case of
0
the current hearsay rules.12
III. Confrontation Clause from Federal Courts to Military Commissions
The stakes are high in the al-Nashiri trial. On the defense side, alNashiri has been detained since 2002 and capital punishment looms. On
the prosecution side, al-Nashiri represents one of only four military
commission trials in Guant6inamo despite the detention of hundreds of
alleged terrorists.1 21 On all sides, al-Nashiri's case has potentially farwhere required by the unique circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence
operations during hostilities or by other practical need").
1 7 Marjorie Cohn, GuantdnamoPrisonerAl-Nashiri's Case Demonstrates Unfairness of Military
Commissions, TRUTH-OUT (June 18, 2013), http://truth-out.org/news/item/17058-guantanamoprisoner-al-nashiris-case-demonstrates-unfaimess-of-militarycommissions?tmpl=component&print=-l.
Adam Hudson, Contentionand Confusion in GuantdnamoPre-Trial Hearingsfor Al-Nashiri
Military Commissions, TRUTH-OUT (June 18, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://truth-out.org/news/item/
17038-guantanamopre-trial-hearings-for-al-nashiri-demonstrate-issues-with-use-of-militarycommissions (describing complaints from al-Nashiri's defense counsel).
!*' John Knefel, Justice at Guantdnamo:From the Profound to the Absurb, ROLLING STONE (June
13, 2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ustice-at-guantanamo-fromthe-profound-to-the-absurd-20130613.
"21' See Charlie Savage, Accused Al-Qaeda Leader Arraigned in 2000 Cole Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2011, at A21, available at 2011 WLNR 23259073 [hereinafter Savage - Cole Attack] ("It
could also test the legality of tribunal rules that allow greater flexibility than in the traditional
criminal justice system for prosecutors to introduce 'hearsay' evidence-testimony about
statements and other evidence collected outside of the courtroom, giving the defendant no
opportunity to cross-examine the person who provided them."); Savage - Guantanamo Cases,
supra note 38.
'1)'
Guant~namo detainees Hamdan and al-Bahlul were both tried and convicted. See ELSEA
2013, supra note 94, at 2. In addition to the al-Nashiri prosecution, there is a separate
prosecution ongoing in Guantinamo against Khalid Shaikh Mohammad and four codefendants allegedly responsible for the September 11th attacks. See Press Release, Dep't of
Justice, Justice Department Refers Five Accused 9/11 Plotters to Military Commissions (Apr. 4,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-ag-421.html. Other convictions
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reaching impact, as it brings into focus a constitutional issue for military
commissions generally: Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment apply in a military commission? The defense and prosecution
recently litigated this issue on a defense motion for judicial notice that the
Confrontation Clause applies. The motion was styled as a request for
judicial notice because the issue is prospective, seeking a trial right for a
trial that has not yet begun.l a
The parties argued the motion with an emphasis on hearsay statements
from a certain individual, Fahd al-Quso, that will likely be proffered in alNashiri's trial. 123 Al-Quso, one of several witnesses who have implicated alNashiri in terrorist activities, 124 was an alleged co-conspirator in the
USS Cole bombing and planned to videotape the attack for al Qaeda
propaganda. 125 He is unavailable to testify because he was killed in May
2012 by a United States drone strike in Yemen. 126 According to al-Nashiri's
counsel, al-Quso is "the most dramatic example" of an unavailable
witness. 127 The prosecution relied heavily on "the al-Quso material" in its
referral of capital charges against al-Nashiri: "the government must have
regarded that evidence as important to its case. And we know that he is
1 28
dead."

were obtained by plea bargain. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GUANTANAMO BAY
DETAINEES: FACILITIES AND FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION IF DETAINEES WERE BROUGHT TO THE
UNITED STATES 8 nn.17, 18 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650032.pdf.

I2::
Government Response to Defense Motion to Take Judicial Notice That the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, As
Interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, Applies to This Capital Military Commission
at 6-14, United States v. Al-Nashiri, AE 109 (Mil. Comm'n Trial Judiciary Sept. 25, 2012)
(arguing that defense motion is unripe), available at http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/
alNashiri2/A%20Nashiri%20I1%20%28AE109A%29.pdf.
XS See Unofficial/Unauthenticated Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Take
Judicial Notice at 1880, United States v. A1-Nashiri (Mil. Comm'n Trial Judiciary June 11, 2013)
[hereinafter UnofficialUnauthenticated Transcript], available at http://www.mc.mil/portals
/0/PDFs/alnashiri2/al%20Nashiri%20II%20(TRANS11June2013-PM1).PDF (recording defense
counsel describing al-Quso as a "central" witness); see also id. at 1886 (recording defense
counsel stating that "I'm just using al-Quso as an example. There's probably countless
others.").
"2 See Al Nashiri Evidence Summary, supra note 13, at 1-2 (identifying witnesses Jamal
Mohammad Ahmad al-Badawi and Mohammed Rashid Daoud al-Owhali).
'2",
See Phil Hirschkorn, Who Was Fahd al-Quso?, CBS NEWS (May 7, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-57429253-503543/who-was-fahd-al-quso/. Al-Quso
later told an FBI agent that he overslept and failed to videotape the attack. Id.
i Eric Schmitt, Militant Linked to Bombing of U.S. Warship Is Said to Be Killed in Yemen, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2012, at A6, availableat 2012 WLNR 9571155.
Unofficial/Unauthenticated Transcript, supra note 123, at 1905.
. Id. at 1909.
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While the defendant's hearsay concerns are now tabled by an order
denying his motion, 129 this motion is not the first time the topic of
unavailable witnesses has emerged in al-Nashiri's Guantinamo
proceedings. 13° Al-Nashiri himself raised it years earlier, in 2007 during the
hearing to review his status as an enemy combatant. At that hearing, the
government identified a statement from a witness named Mohammed
Rashid Daoud al-Owhali that al-Nashiri helped him obtain a false Yemeni
passport. 131 Al-Nashiri claimed to have "no idea how that thing happened"
and not to remember al-Owhali. 132 In al-Owhali's absence, al-Nashiri
lamented that "I wish I had the chance to speak with and ask him how he
claims that. I have no idea where he brought this stuff from." 133 Toward the
end of the hearing, al-Nashiri asked the tribunal, "If you want you can
bring the Al-Owhali and I would like to know. How he's, he is able to say
what he is claiming?" 134 The tribunal president rejected this question as an
135
untimely request for a witness.
With his motion for judicial notice, al-Nashiri's counsel filed an
untimely request for application of the Confrontation Clause. The issue is
sure to emerge again at trial. According to defense counsel, hearsay
statements from al-Quso would not be outlier evidence. Of the ample
discovery received thus far from prosecutors, "[i]t's all hearsay." 36 The alNashiri trial, then, meets the Confrontation Clause head-on.

1 ; Order on Defense Motion to Take Judicial Notice at 3, United States v. AI-Nashiri, AE
109C (Military Comm'n Trial Judiciary Aug. 22,2013).
1- Hints of a Confrontation Clause issue arose in other detainee cases, as well. See Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-702, 2004 WL 2678664, at *17 (Nov. 22,
2004) (citing Crawford and arguing that "the confrontation rights of courts-martial must extend
to military commissions").
1 Status Review Hearing Transcript, supra note 6, at 6. Al-Owhali confessed and was
convicted in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York of participating in the
1998 bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi. See Al Nashiri Evidence Summary,
supra note 13, at 1. He is serving a life sentence in a federal maximum security prison in
Florence, Colorado. See Phil Hirschkorn, Convicted al Qaeda Soldiers ask for Jury Probe, CNN
(Jan. 17, 2003), http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/17/embassy.bombings.appeal/.
2 Status Review Hearing Transcript, supra note 6, at 30.
'3
'
"s

11

Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Unofficial/Unauthenticated Transcript, supra note 123, at 1912Mil. Comm'n; see Savage-

Cole Attack, supra note 120; Savage - Guantanamo Cases, supra note 38 ("Much of the
evidence against Mr. Nashiri consists of witness interviews and documents gathered by the
F.B.I. in Yemen after the bombing. Prosecutors may call the F.B.I. agents as witnesses to
describe what they learned during their investigation-hearsay that would be admissible
under tribunal rules, but not in federal court.").
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A. Testimonial Statements in Civilian Tribunals
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
restricts the admission of hearsay statements in a criminal prosecution. An
"accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses
against him," thus erecting a barrier against testimony from unavailable
witnesses whom the criminal defendant cannot cross-examine. 137 While the
Confrontation Clause's prohibitions are not identical to prohibitions
against hearsay statements, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to
139
protect similar values" 138 and "stem from the same roots."
The Supreme Court has interpreted the extent of the Confrontation
Clause's hearsay barrier through years of case law, articulating its modem
view in the 2004 case of Crawford v. Washington.14 There, the petitioner had
been convicted of assault for stabbing a man who allegedly attempted to
rape his wife.14' The prosecution played for the jury a recording of the
wife's statement to police, seeking to refute the petitioner's claim of selfdefense. 142 The trial court admitted her statement even though the
petitioner could not cross-examine his wife because the marital privilege
precluded her testimony. 43 The Washington Supreme Court evaluated the
circumstances of the wife's statement, determined the statement to be
reliable, and upheld the conviction.'" On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that the state court's method for determining reliability violated the
14
Confrontation Clause. 5
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, laid out a new test for
application of the Confrontation Clause: consistent with the Sixth
Amendment, "testimonial statements" from absent witnesses are
admissible "only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814
(1990) ("[W]e have also been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions
with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements.").
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-53
(1992); cf. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (When determining the primary
purpose of a statement for Confrontation Clause analysis, "standard rules of hearsay,
designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.").
*

'

See generally 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 38, 41.
ld. at 38,40.
ISee id. at 40 (explaining that the Washington marital privilege generally prohibits one

spouse from testifying without the other spouse's consent).
"

Id.
at 41.

"

Id. at 65-69.
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defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine."' 46 This test
diverges from the Supreme Court's decision nearly a quarter century
earlier in Ohio v. Roberts, which allowed juries to hear any hearsay
statement "based on a mere judicial determination of reliability." 147 While
Justice Scalia agreed with the Roberts Court that the Confrontation Clause's
"ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence," he cast this
48
constitutional guarantee as procedural rather than substantive.
Reliability of testimonial hearsay must "be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." 49 The facts before the
Court involved testimonial hearsay.' s° Because the petitioner's wife had
made her statement to police during interrogation, the marital privilege
had rendered her unavailable to testify, and there had been no opportunity
for cross-examination, admission of the wife's statement violated the
petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation."'
Significantly, Crawford took a stand only on the treatment of
testimonial hearsay, leaving open the proper treatment of nontestimonial
hearsay. 52 For nontestimonial statements, courts were welcome to apply
Roberts' malleable standard of judicially determined reliability or to
"exempt[] such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether."5 3 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court offered minimal guidance
on defining "testimonial," as it expressly declined to do so in Crawford and
instead discussed a handful of examples. 1 4 Statements given during police
interrogations and in prior testimony are testimonial; business records and

Id. at 59. Of course, the defendant may not procure a witness' unavailability in order to
prevent that witness from testifying. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008) (clarifying
the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception to Sixth Amendment that "unconfronted testimony
would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness
from testifying").
" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; see id. at 60 ("This malleable standard often fails to protect
against paradigmatic confrontation violations."); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)
(explaining that an unconfronted statement may be admitted so long as the statement "bears
adequate 'indicia of reliability,"' and that reliability may be inferred where the statement fails
under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or has "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness").
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
"'
hi

Id.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 68-69 (reversing and remanding the judgment of the Washington Supreme

Court).
'2

See id. at 59, 68.
Id. at 68.

".

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 & n.10.
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statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are not. 55 The Court's later
opinions offer additional illustrations and proposed definitions of
"testimonial." These later opinions also clarify that the Confrontation
Clause-along with Crawford's procedural guarantee of crossexamination -reaches no further than testimonial statements. 156
In Davis v. Washington,157 another opinion authored by Justice Scalia,
the high court parsed certain types of statements made to policedistinguishing between statements seeking emergency assistance and
statements recording events "potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecutions."' 1 8 The former are nontestimonial, the latter testimonial. 59
Applying this distinction, the Court found that a victim's answers to a 911
emergency operator's questions were nontestimonial because they were
informal and "necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency." 160 The
victim's statements were outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.' 61
In the companion case of Hammon v. Indiana, by contrast, the Court found
that a domestic battery victim's statements in an affidavit to police were
testimonial because they were "formal enough" and "neither a cry for help
nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a

i5 Id. at 53, 55, 68; see Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) ("Business
and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify
under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because-having been created for the
administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact at trial-they are not testimonial.").
See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1153, 1157 (2011) (identifying Crawford as source
of Confrontation Clause limit and noting that the Confrontation Clause does not require
nontestimonial statements "to be subject to the crucible of cross-examination"); Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) ("It is the testimonial character of the statement that
separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay
evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause."); see also United States v. Charles, 722
F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding an interpreter's statements to be testimonial, and
noting that "in clarifying the appropriate test under the Confrontation Clause for admitting
testimonial out-of-court statements of a declarant, the Court in Crawford overruled the test that
it previously laid out in Ohio v. Roberts"); United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir.
2005) ("Because the categorical rule adopted in Crawford is triggered only with respect to
'testimonial' evidence, whether a challenged statement falls within the class of evidence
deemed 'testimonial' will generally be outcome-determinative.").
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; see also id. (noting that the opinion was not "attempting to
produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements").
Id.; see Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1155 (stating that admissibility of a statement made to
resolve an emergency "is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the
Confrontation Clause").
'"
Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
•61 Seeid. at 828.
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threatening situation." 162 That victim's statements were within the scope of,
and excluded by, the Confrontation Clause. 163
The subsequent case of Michigan v. Bryant provoked a dissent from
Justice Scalia, with Justice Sotomayor writing a majority opinion that
hones-or in Scalia's view, distorts-the criteria for testimonial statements
suggested in Davis and Hammon.M Bryant introduced an objective two-part
test for applying the Confrontation Clause. First, a statement must be made
with "a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony," 165 that is, proving past events relevant to future prosecution. 166
Second, the statement should display a measure of formality.167 While not
outcome-determinative, formality suggests that the purpose of the
16
statement was to create a trial record. 8
In Bryant, the Supreme Court considered whether the Confrontation
Clause barred admission of statements to police from a gunshot victim,
lying fatally wounded in a gas station parking lot. 69 Viewing the
circumstances objectively, the Court determined that the primary purpose
of the victim's statements was to enable police to address the ongoing
emergency of an armed and at-large assailant. 70 The statements were also
informal, made in the "fluid and somewhat confused" context of police
assistance to a dying man.171 Accordingly, the victim's "identification and

1(2 Id. at 830, 832.
113 See id. at 829-30, 834.
dissenting)
"' See id. at 822, 829; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1153-56; cf. id. at 1173, 1175 (Scalia, J.,
(rejecting the majority's "resurrected interest in reliability" and "distorted view").
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.

1

Id. at 1154 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
1 Id. at 1160 (noting that "informality does not necessarily indicate the presence of an
emergency or the lack of testimonial intent"); see also Williams v. Illinois, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2242
(2012) (stating that the Confrontation Clause addresses "formalized statements such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions"); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.
Ct. 2705, 2710-11 (2011) (finding that, in a DWI case, the Confrontation Clause excluded a lab
analyst's certificate that defendant's blood-alcohol level exceeded the legal limit); MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-12 (2009) (finding that, in a cocaine distribution and
trafficking case, the Confrontation Clause excluded an analysis certificate regarding substance
in defendant's possession).
"

, See Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1160.
See id. at 1150.
Id. The Court added that "the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of
the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable
participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals' statements and actions and
the circumstances in which the encounter occurred." Id. at 1156.
'l See id. at 1166; Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[Flormality or
informality can shed light on whether a particular statement has a primary purpose of use at
trial.").
"'

"
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description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were not
testimonial statements," and their admission in the defendant's murder
trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 172
The Supreme Court's latest addition to the Confrontation Clause
landscape is Williams v. Illinois, a case that obscures more than it
illuminates. With a plurality opinion, two concurrences, and a four-justice
dissent, Williams fails to offer a consensus view of testimonial statements or anything at all. Writing for the plurality, Justice Alito presented two
criteria: a testimonial statement has "the primary purpose of accusing a
targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct" and involves
"formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions." 173 Only four justices subscribed to this formulation. 174 It
certainly shifts from Bryant, which established that a testimonial
statement's primary purpose is to create a trial record and that formality is
a helpful supplement. 17
The plurality in Williams discussed testimonial statements only in
hypothetical terms after concluding that the out-of-court statements at
issue were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 176 At the
petitioner's rape trial, an expert had testified that a DNA profile from an
outside laboratory matched a profile from the state police laboratory using
petitioner's blood.'7 The expert referred to the report not to prove that it
contained an accurate DNA profile, but "only for the 'distinctive and
limited purpose' of seeing whether it matched something else."1 78 Because
the expert's testimony was not offered for its truth and the laboratory
report itself was not admitted into evidence, the Confrontation Clause
simply did not apply. 179
Further, the plurality found that even if the laboratory report had been
admitted into evidence, still there would have been no Confrontation

1

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242.
See id. at 2265 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (describing plurality opinion as essentially a

dissent because "[flive Justices specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every
paragraph of its explication").
' See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1154, 1160; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
I 132 S. Ct. at 2228. "Even if the.., report had been introduced for its truth, we would
nevertheless conclude that there was no Confrontation Clause violation." Id. at 2242. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9 (2004) (stating that the Clause "does not bar
the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted").
Williams, 132 S.Ct. at 2227.
"

Id. at 2240 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409,417 (1985)).
See id. at 2235, 2240.
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Clause violationIse While scientific reports generally satisfy the
requirement of formality,18' an objective view of the report in Williams
shows that it fails the requirement of primary purpose. The laboratory
received DNA samples in order "to catch a dangerous rapist who was still
at large." 82 Because its primary purpose was "not to accuse petitioner or to
create evidence for use at trial" but instead to confront a public threat, the
laboratory report did not constitute a testimonial statement.1s3
In the end, the Supreme Court has constructed an interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment that limits a criminal defendant's right of confrontation
to out-of-court statements provided, often in a formal setting, for the
primary purpose of giving incriminating trial testimony.' 84 This case law
development may be incomplete and confusing, even to the Justices
themselves.185 But for now it yields a surprising result: the concept of
testimonial hearsay appears consistent only with the civilian tribunals in
which it was developed. The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence invites an understanding of testimonial hearsay as uniquely
civilian and, thus, inconsistent with military commissions as wartime
tribunals.
B.

Nontestimonial Statements in Wartime Tribunals

Crawford breaks down the elements of a Confrontation Clause analysis:
a testimonial statement, unavailability, and cross-examination. Grafting
this analysis from an Article III court onto a military commission, the key
element remains the testimonial character of a hearsay statement. Many
witnesses will be unavailable at a military commission trial, and many
defendants will lack any opportunity for cross-examination. Indeed, this is

Id. at 2228, 2242.
See id. at 2243; Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710-11 (2011); MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts 557 U.S. 305, 310-12 (2009). But see Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas,
J.,concurring) (reasoning that the lab report was admissible as a nontestimonial statement
because it "lack[ed] the solemnity of an affidavit or deposition, for it is neither a sworn nor a
certified declaration of fact").
Williams, 132 S.Ct. at 2243.
's

" Id. at 2243-44.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1168-69 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that an out-of-court statement is testimonial only if the declarant both "intend[s]
the statement to be a solemn declaration rather than an unconsidered or offhand remark" and
"make[s] the statement with the understanding that it may be used to invoke the coercive
machinery of the State against the accused").
""

See Williams, 132 S.Ct. at 2265, 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the plurality's
decision as "fractured," complaining that the five Justices who agreed on the case result
"agree on very little" and "have left significant confusion in their wake," and that prior
"decisions apparently no longer mean all that they say").
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precisely the situation that prompted al-Nashiri's motion for application of
the Confrontation Clause in his Guantinamo prosecution, with statements
from deceased witness al-Quso illustrating the defendant's hearsay
concerns. So attention must be paid to testimonial statements, the only
kind of hearsay evidence that implicates the Confrontation Clause.
In deciding Davis and Hammond jointly and Bryant and Williams
subsequently, the Supreme Court moved from the narrow context of
domestic violence to the wider context of nondomestic violencerespectively, attacks from a gunman and a rapist. The Court tailored the
concept of a testimonial statement to fit the new context. 186 In the latter
cases, the ongoing emergency "extends beyond an initial victim to a
potential threat to the responding police and the public at large." 187 As the
zone of danger expands, nearly all statements may be interpreted
objectively as confronting the threat.'8
Both Bryant and Williams support a categorical approach, as each
contains a thread that is subtle in the majority and plurality opinions but
highlighted in the dissents. Specifically, testimonial statements vanish in
the context of public danger, regardless of a statement's purpose or
formality. 18 9 The Court in Bryant proclaimed that "the existence vel non of
an ongoing emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry,"
but only "among the most important circumstances that courts must take
into account." 190 This proclamation proves stronger in theory than in
practice.
When faced with specific statements from the gunshot victim in Bryant,
the Court treated as nontestimonial everything the victim told police.' 9'
Without the aid of a transcript, the Court learned that the police asked
"what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had

i, See id. at 2243 (considering nontestimonial statements used to match DNA profile of
rapist); Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156 (considering nontestimoial statements used to identify and
locate gunman).
Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1156.
ia'See id. at 1163-66. Like an excited utterance, "[aln ongoing emergency has a similar
effect of focusing an individual's attention on responding to the emergency." Id. at 1157; see
also Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (stating that the plurality extends the
"ongoing emergency" precedents); Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1163-65 (finding nontestimonial a
victim's direct identification of the assailant).
"' By contrast, in two cases of non-violent crimes, the Court declined to carve out a
categorical exception under the Confrontation Clause for forensic evidence. See Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717-18 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
317-22 (2009).
Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1165, 1162.
>

Id. at 1167.
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occurred." 192 The victim answered "I was shot" or "Rick shot me," quickly
identified the gunman as "Rick," and gave a physical description. 193 He
added that "Rick had shot him through the back door of Rick's house." 194
These identifying statements could fit squarely under the heading of
"providing incriminating trial testimony" for Rick's future prosecution. 19
Regardless, the danger of an at-large gunman transformed all out-of-court
statements into nontestimonial hearsay.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia revealed the upshot of the majority
opinion: it "creates an expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for
violent crimes." 196 From the victim's perspective, "his statements had little
value except to ensure the arrest and eventual prosecution" of his
assailant. 97 Other than confirming a rather obvious gunshot wound, the
statements had nothing to do with tending to the victim. 198 Accordingly,
the police could gather witness accounts against any defendant, and
conviction could rest "solely on the officers' recollection at trial of the
witnesses' accusations."' 99 Given "a continuing threat to public safety," all
statements made in the context of that threat are deemed nontestimonial. 20°
A similar view emerged in Williams. There, the plurality treated as
nontestimonial a laboratory report that matched DNA from a rapist. 201 Like
the dissent in Bryant, the dissent in Williams revealed the effect of the
22
plurality's opinion: "to stretch... our 'ongoing emergency' test." 0
Nontestimonial statements may now be made outside the immediacy of an
attack, even after a suspect is in custody. 2 3 Indeed, the opinion cast as

0,)2Id. at 1163.
k)3Id. at 1163, 1165.
'9

Id. at 1163 n.14.

Id. at 1167.
dissenting); id. at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173 (Scalia, J.,
(quoting id. at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
"9'

Id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
w' See id. at 1171.
v Id. at 1173.
2 Id.
2))
See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2242-44 (2012).
Id. at 2274.
: While the DNA match in Williams was produced before the petitioner was suspected of
rape, he had in fact already been arrested on unrelated charges. See id. at 2229 (describing the
rape in February 2000, then the provision of DNA samples to the laboratory, then the arrest of
the suspect in August 2000, then the identification of the suspect as the rapist in April 2001,
and noting that the "computer showed a match to a profile produced by the lab from a sample
of petitioner's blood that had been taken after he was arrested on unrelated charges on August
3, 2000") (emphasis added). But see id. at 2243 (distinguishing testimonial statements in the
Melendez-Diaz DWI case and the Bullcoming cocaine case, where "[t]here was nothing
'
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nontestimonial the statements from "laboratory analysts conducting
routine tests far away from a crime scene"; laboratory reports that did not
begin until nine months after the crime nor conclude until thirteen months
after; and laboratory reports prepared for the express "purpose of
producing evidence, not enabling emergency responders." 204 As in Bryant,
the Court considered statements that were "in every conceivable
respect ...meant to serve as evidence in a potential criminal trial" and, in
the context of a threat to public safety, deemed all statements to be
205
nontestimonial.
This categorical approach to nontestimonial statements finds support
in other Confrontation Clause cases, even sympathy from Justice Scalia.
Writing for the Supreme Court in Giles v. California, Justice Scalia
considered the doctrine of "forfeiture by wrongdoing" as a Confrontation
Clause exception.2 °6 The exception applies "only when the defendant
engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying."2 2 7 The
facts of Giles involved domestic violence, and there Justice Scalia described
the entire category of a victim's "[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about
abuse and intimidation and statements to physicians in the course of
receiving treatment" as nontestimonial and outside the concern of the
Confrontation Clause. 208 Such statements "would be excluded, if at all, only
by hearsay rules." 2°9
Thus, the Supreme Court has invited a categorical exception under the
Confrontation Clause for public danger. Treating all statements proffered
in a wartime tribunal as nontestimonial is consistent with these precedents
because a military commission provides an even more extreme context
than domestic violence or an assailant on the loose. In a military

resembling an ongoing emergency, as the suspects in both cases had already been captured").
20 Id. at 2274 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also rejects the plurality's view that the
expert's testimony about the laboratory report was not offered for its truth: "[aidmission of
the out-of-court statement in this context has no purpose separate from its truth." Id. at 2269.
Id. at 2275. Justice Breyer's concurring opinion also opened the door to a categorical
approach, as he "would consider reports such as the DNA report before us presumptively to
lie outside the perimeter of the Clause as established by the Court's precedents." Id. at 2251
(Breyer, J., concurring).
554 U.S. 353, 357 (2008).
2~

Id. at 359. The Court held that California's forfeiture doctrine, which did not consider a

defendant's intent, was not an exception to the Confrontation Clause because it was "unheard
of at the time of the founding or for 200 years thereafter." Id. at 377; see also Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) ("But when defendants seek to undermine the judicial
process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment
does not require courts to acquiesce.").
-

Giles, 554 U.S. at 376.
IId.
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commission trial, the ongoing emergency stretches from the immediate
public to an "extraordinary threat" to the entire United States. 2 0 Beyond a
danger arising from the actions of one individual, the threat from
international terrorism arises from the actions of many individuals, both in
custody and at large. 211 Extending the logic of Bryant and Williams to the
terrorism context, all hearsay in a military commission trial may be viewed
objectively as nontestimonial because a military commission exists-by
design-only in the context of war.
The wartime creation and purpose of military commissions situate
these courts outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. 212 A military
commission is convened before a military judge to try individuals accused
of offenses during war, acting as a "constitutionally recognized agenc[y]
213
for meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war."
Under the Military Commissions Act, only an "alien unprivileged enemy
belligerent" is subject to trial by military commission. 214 Jurisdiction is
limited to foreign citizens who have "engaged in hostilities against the
United States," "supported hostilities against the United States," or

21"

Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)

(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note) (stating that September 11th "acts continue to pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States"); see AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 46 (discussing a real threat of "mass death and
destruction in the United States and elsewhere"); Military Order, supranote 40 (describing the
"extraordinary emergency"); Proclamation, supra note 45 ("A national emergency exists by
reason of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the
Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.");
cf. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1158 (2011) (noting that "duration and scope of an
emergency may depend in part on the type of weapon employed").
:1I See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2229 (2012) (admitting nontestimonial
statements after suspect in custody on unrelated charges).
22'Even Article II courts have recognized the need to accommodate hearsay for wartime
Oct.
testimony. See, e.g., United States v. West, No. 08 CR 669, 2010 WL 3951941, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
4, 2010) (admitting entire declaration obtained from unavailable witness in distant war zone,
and noting that "the Court believes that the circumstances of this case warrant some
flexibility" and that "[clourts can relax the rules of hearsay under some circumstances"); see
also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (considering writ of habeas corpus filed
by father of Guantinamo detainee, and observing that "enemy-combatant proceedings may
be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing
military conflict. Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available
evidence from the Government in such a proceeding"). But see Bostan v. Obama, 662 F. Supp.
2d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting Hamdi interpretation that "suggests that hearsay should be
routinely admitted into evidence" in habeas cases).
21 See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346 (1952); ELSEA 2013, supra note 94, at 4.
2 1 MCA of 2009 § 948c; see A1-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S.Ct. 1814 (2011) (describing a class of persons subject to military commission trials
under the MCAs).
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belonged to al Qaeda. 215 Moreover, an offense is triable by military
commission "only if the offense is committed in the context of and
associated with hostilities." 216 Just as an ongoing emergency "focuses the
participants on something other than 'prov[ing] past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecutions,' 2 7 ongoing hostilities focus the
mind elsewhere: on the national emergency. 218 The greater the threat, the
greater the focus. Justice Scalia's dissent in Bryant exposed the Court's new
exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes, and a military
commission simply applies this exception writ large: for crimes related to
21 9
international terrorism.

Treating all statements in a wartime tribunal as nontestimonial is also
consistent with the canon of constitutional avoidance, as it sidesteps the
thorny issue of whether the Sixth Amendment reaches Guantinamo. 220
Interpreting the statutory term "hearsay" in the Military Commissions Act
to mean only nontestimonial statements allows the MCA hearsay

21 MCA of 2009 §§ 948a(7), 948c.
"' Id. § 950p(c); see also id. § 948d (limiting jurisdiction to offenses made punishable by the
MCA, statutes against aiding the enemy and espionage, or the law of war, whether committed
before or after September 11, 2001).
2' Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 822 (2006)).
2 See id.; Proclamation, supra note 45.
21 Given the wartime creation and purpose of military commissions, all cases before these
courts should fit within the Bryant and Williams Confrontation Clause exception regardless of
the eventual contours of that exception in federal courts. See, e.g., Marc McAllister, Evading
Confrontation: From One Amorphous Standard to Another, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 473, 519-26
(2012) (proposing bright-line test under which "any statements obtained from a would-be
witness to a crime during the crime's res gestae would be deemed per se nontestimonial");
Sloan A. Heffron, Note, Resuscitating Roberts? How Courts Should Construe the "Emergency"
Exception to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 861, 886-90
(2012) (proposing six factors for determination of ongoing emergency); Jason Widdison,
Comment, Michigan v. Bryant: The Ghost of Roberts and the Return of Reliability, 47 GONZ. L. REV.
219, 238-39 (2012) (proposing state constitutions as source of confrontation protection);
William Reed, Comment, Michigan v. Bryant: Originalism Confronts Pragmatism, 89 DENY. U. L.
REV. 269, 295-99 (2011) (proposing rule to narrow "ongoing emergency" exception); see AlBihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (stating that the Confrontation Clause does not apply in habeas corpus
cases).
2: See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008) ("[W]e are obligated to construe the
statute to avoid [constitutional] problems if it is 'fairly possible' to do so."); United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953) (noting that the canon is a decisive guide "in the choice of fair
alternatives"); Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("[C]ourts
interpret ambiguous statutes to avoid serious questions of unconstitutionality."); see also
Order on Defense Motion to Take Judicial Notice at 2-3, United States v. Al-Nashiri, AE 109C
(Military Comm'n Trial Judiciary Aug. 22, 2013) (denying motion in part based on
constitutional avoidance).
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provisions to govern Guant~namo prosecutions without risking a
Confrontation Clause violation. 221 Applying Bryant and Williams to the vast
"continuing threat to public safety" that is international terrorism, 2 this
analysis of hearsay evidence renders an analysis of constitutional reach
unnecessary.
At least one part of the Constitution does have full effect at
Guant6.namo. The Supreme Court's opinion in Boumediene v. Bush
established that the Suspension Clause of Article I applies to Guantinamo,
protecting the privilege of habeas corpus for foreign detainees. 223 Indeed,
this opinion likely influenced President Obama's heightened emphasis on
the rule of law in reforming military commissions. 224 While Boumediene
speaks to the general question of constitutional reach, the opinion did not
decide the application of other constitutional clauses. 2 In the al-Nashiri
case, defense counsel has relied on Boumediene to argue that the
Confrontation Clause applies, and prosecution counsel has relied on it to
argue the opposite. 226 A categorical approach to hearsay statements in
227
military commission trials avoids this constitutional question.
Simply put, categorizing all hearsay evidence in a military commission
trial as nontestimonial statements takes the Confrontation Clause out of
play. Even if the Sixth Amendment reaches GuantAnamo, still the
Confrontation Clause does not bar out-of-court statements in a wartime
prosecution because those statements are not the kind of hearsay evidence
that implicates the Confrontation Clause. Outside the concern of the
Confrontation Clause, "the admissibility of a statement is the concern of

2: See MCA of 2009 § 949a; MIL.COMM'N R. EvID. 803.
2

See Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1173.

See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
See discussion supra pp. 268-271.
22 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732 ("We hold these petitioners do have the habeas corpus
privilege."); id. at 771 (applying Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution).
Compare Defendant's Motion to Take Judicial Notice that the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as Interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court Applies to this Capital Military Commission at 9-13, United States v.
Al-Nashiri, AE 109 (Mil. Comm'n Trial Judiciary Sept. 12, 2012), with Government Response to
Defense Motion to Take Judicial Notice that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as Interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court Applies to this Capital Military Commission at 11-13, United States v. AlNashiri, AE 109 (MI. Comm'n Trial Judiciary Sept. 25, 2012).
227 See Order on Defense Motion to Take Judicial Notice at 3, United States v. AI-Nashiri,
AE 109C (Mil. Comm'n Trial Judiciary Aug. 22, 2013) (expressing willingness to rule on
constitutional questions "only where it is necessary to confront the constitutional issue
squarely').
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state and federal rules of evidence." 228
A military commission has its own rules of evidence to fill the void,
and those rules are consistent with Confrontation Clause values. AlNashiri's trial is a fine example.
IV. Hearsay Reliability in AI-Nashiri Trial
Consider the motion for judicial notice filed in the al-Nashiri case.
Defense counsel argued that the Confrontation Clause should apply to "all
future issues" regarding hearsay evidence from unavailable witnesses,
including al-Quso. 229 In al-Nashiri's view, the military judge should apply
the same "rules that would apply in every other American criminal
prosecution or criminal proceeding," and that way "the parties know the
rules." 230 In fact, the parties already know the rules: the provisions of the
Military Commissions Act and the Military Commission Rules of Evidence,
including rules on hearsay. 231
Under the MCA of 2009 and accompanying evidence rules, a military
commission judge decides admissibility of hearsay evidence by examining
each statement for probative value and promotion of justice. 232 The judge
must consider "all of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the
statement," 233 look within the statement for "indicia of reliability," 234 search
for "guarantees of trustworthiness," 235 and make the "mere judicial

224

Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011); see also Arthur L. Gaston I, Use of

Hearsay in Military Commissions, 62 NAVAL L. REV. 76, 90-101 (2013) (providing historical
justification for constitutionality of the MCA's flexible hearsay rules).
22 Defendant's Motion to Take Judicial Notice that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as Interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court Applies to this Capital Military Commission at 1, United States v. A1-Nashiri,
AE 109 (MI. Comm'n Trial Judiciary Sept. 12, 2012); see Unofficial/Unauthenticated
Transcript, supra note 123, at 1905 Mil. Comm'n(complaining of unpredictability for purposes
of resource allocation by defense counsel).
2,1Unofficial/Unauthenticated Transcript, supra note 123, at 1876, 1881 Mil. Comm'n
(quoting defense counsel that "[hiere we don't know what the rule is. We have no idea...
" Id. at 1902 (quoting the Judge's statement that "[it seems to me that on this issue there
is a clear rule that currently you have to operate under. So when you say that you don't have a
rule, you do have a rule, it's a rule you don't like."); see discussion supra Part Il.B.
2 MCA of 2009 § 949a(b)(3); see MIL. COMM'N R. EVID. 803; see also
Unofficial/Unauthenticated Transcript, supra note 123, at 1903 Mil. Comm'n("The government
provides you notice and summary of what it says of all witnesses that it's going to rely on this
rule, and then we litigate them one at a time under the standards of this rule.").
-" MCA of 2009 § 949a(b)(3).
13' Id.; see Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (recognizing a statement as admissible
"only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability'").
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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determination of reliability" 236 extolled in Roberts and disparaged in
Crawford. For the nontestimonial hearsay at issue in a military commission
trial, this rule makes sense-and is consistent with the Confrontation
Clause values recognized in Crawford.
Even while replacing the Roberts standard of judicial determination
with a procedural guarantee of cross-examination for testimonial
statements, the Supreme Court in Crawford acknowledged that the
Confrontation Clause's "ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
evidence." 237 For nontestimonial hearsay, courts achieve this goal by
methods other than cross-examination. Hearsay laws can be flexible,
permitting courts to follow Roberts and examine nontestimonial statements
for guarantees of trustworthiness.2m For an entire category of
nontestimonial hearsay, such judicial examination becomes the norm.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Bryant is again instructive. There, the Court's
treatment of all victim statements as nontestimonial resurrected reliability
to guide Confrontation Clause analysis, at least in the context of
"emergencies and faux emergencies." 239 The United States faces a real
emergency in terrorist attacks and hostilities from al Qaeda and associated
forces, 24° and Guantdnamo is the venue for prosecution of offenses during
this war. Military commission rules governing Guantfnamo prosecutions
ensure that reliability guides hearsay analysis. Those rules realize the
Confrontation Clause value of reliability through the substantive guarantee
of judicial evaluation.
For al-Nashiri, there is no doubt that his military commission case
exists in the context of war. He faces capital charges for allegedly bombing
both the USS Cole and the MIV Limburg and attempting to bomb the USS
The Sullivans, all terrorist acts that occurred in Yemen in 2000 and 2002.241
His trial is unfolding against the backdrop of the September 11th attacks,

:" Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
" Id. at 61.
See id. at 51, 60, 68 ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent
with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay lawas does Roberts ... .
- Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1174 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
' See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("The United States is
at war against al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization."); Proclamation, supra note 45;
Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to Sec'y of the Navy re: Order
Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal 1 (July 7, 2004) (defining "enemy combatant"
as "an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners"),
availableat www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/d2004O7O7review.pdf.

"'" See AI-Nashiri v. McDonald, No. 11-5907, 2012 WL 1642306, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 10,
2012).
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armed conflict, international terrorism, CIA waterboarding, enemy
combatant status, military detention, and, finally, prosecution under the
latest MCA.
Despite this backdrop, al-Nashiri tried to persuade a federal judge that
a military commission could not be convened to try him because no
hostilities existed in Yemen until 2003 at the earliest. 242 Accordingly, "the
underlying allegations did not occur in the context of and were not
associated with hostilities." 243 Filing a lawsuit against the convening official
in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, al-Nashiri
sought a declaration that the military commission lacked jurisdiction to
hear charges against him. 244 The district court dismissed al-Nashiri's

lawsuit, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the MCA to
make such a declaration.2 4 Whether the events giving rise to al-Nashiri's
charges occurred in the context of hostilities relates to "a core aspect of the
trial," and a military commission is competent to make its own "finding
sufficient for jurisdiction." 246 Tellingly, the military commission
prosecution of al-Nashiri proceeds.
Given the wartime context for al-Nashiri's case, all hearsay evidence
should fall under the Supreme Court's "public danger" exception to the
Confrontation Clause.2 47 Statements from al-Quso and other witnesses
implicate al-Nashiri in terrorist activities, constituting "single-level hearsay
or double-level hearsay" in the form of FBI reports from witness interviews
years ago.2 " In light of the capital charges and the Guantinamo tribunal,
these statements were made in the context of a threat far more severe than

24-

See id. at *3-*4.

243

Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.

214

15 Id. at *6.The court also dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds. See id. at *8-*10.
246Id. at *6 (quotingMCA of 2009 § 948d); see also AI-Nashiri v. Obama, Civ. No. 08-1207

(RWR)(EGS), 2012 WL 5382730, at *2-*3 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 2012) (stating that a district court
overseeing habeas proceeding has no jurisdiction to supervise military commission
proceeding).
21"See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243 (2012); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143,
1156 (2011).
7" Unofficial/Unauthenticated Transcript, supra note 123, at 1912 MI. Comm'n(quoting
defense counsel that evidence is "all FBI agent reports taken after the witnesses were sanitized
by the Yemenis"); see id. at 1881 (quoting defense counsel that "the people who say we saw
him do this, we heard this, we did that, will in large measure be FBI or other agents who
interviewed people in Yemen 13, 14 years ago, who will be reading reports or worse it will be
FBI agents reading reports of other FBI agents"); see also MIL. COMM'N R. EVID. 805 (allowing
admission of hearsay within hearsay "if each part of the combined statements would be
admissible in a military commission").
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the "emergencies and faux emergencies" 249 in Davis, Hammon, Bryant, and
Williams that transformed all out-of-court statements into nontestimonial
hearsay.
For now, the parties continue pre-trial litigation, and the military judge
will consider the concerns raised in al-Nashiri's motion for judicial notice
at a later date. Because the motion sought an order applying the
Confrontation Clause to future issues concerning hearsay evidence, the
judge denied the motion as premature. 50 Trial is scheduled for September
2014. 251 Once trial begins and the prosecution introduces statements from
al-Quso and other unavailable witnesses, defense counsel may raise its
Confrontation Clause objection styled as a motion to exclude. 232 At that
time, the judge may reasonably and objectively notice another feature of
the case, namely, that all hearsay in al-Nashiri's military commission trial
is nontestimonial.
V. Conclusion
Therefore, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence fits into military
commissions as an exercise in determining reliability. Because a testimonial
statement is a civilian concept, military commission treatment of hearsay
evidence is outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause and properly
elevates substantive evaluation over procedural guarantees. On a
statement-by-statement analysis, a military judge preserves the
constitutional value of reliability while admitting or excluding hearsay
evidence from witnesses made unavailable by war. For al-Nashiri, his
protection against unreliable hearsay evidence lies not in the Sixth
Amendment, but in the military commission rules establishing that

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2-'
{ Order on Defense Motion to Take Judicial Notice at 2-3, United States v. Al-Nashiri, AE
24

109C (Mil. Comm'n Trial Judiciary Aug. 22, 2013); see also Unofficial/Unauthenticated
Transcript, supra note 123, at 1893 Mil. Comm'n(noting the Judge's statement to lead
prosecutor that "[n]ow, under your ripeness argument, if Iunderstand it correctly, until you
were to provide said notice to the defense, and they responded with a normal-with a motion
to suppress, the issue is not ripe before me").
251 See Order on Gov't Motion for Scheduling Order at 3, United States v. Al-Nashiri, AE
045H (Mil. Comm'n Trial Judiciary Aug. 21, 2013) (scheduling a trial date of Sept. 2,2014).
:2 In a reverse "forfeiture by wrongdoing" setting, defense counsel may also contend that
the United States is responsible for killing al-Quso, and so should not benefit from its
misdeeds by introducing the deceased's statements without cross-examination. See Giles v.
California, 554 U.S. 353, 377 (2008). Defense counsel raised this contention at the hearing on its
motion for judicial notice. See Unofficial/Unauthenticated Transcript, supra note 123, at 1881
Mil. Comm'n("[I]f the right of confrontation doesn't apply, then we reach the rather perverse
question: Can the United States kill witnesses and then still use their evidence, their hearsay
evidence?").
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